Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 4

6-1-1970

Consumer Class Actions
Robert C. Eckhardt

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 Notre Dame L. Rev. 663 (1970).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol45/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 4

CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
Robert C. Eckhardt*
Most of the great pillars of our legal system are procedural, not substantive
due process, equal protection, the right to be tried by one's peers. Just as
these are the wheels on which judicial justice rides, there are similar wheels that
keep the economy rolling with a degree of equity and fair play - the process of
collective bargaining, commission controls, the technique of using yardsticks like
TVA and REA.
But no such vehicle for justice, equity, and fair play exists for the consumer. Congress has the means of making one - one that is self-induced and
self-propelling, not one that depends for its impetus upon the good motivations
and energetic administration of a commission.
-

I. The Need for the Consumer Class Action
The consumer class action process proposed in H.R. 145851 and similar
bills will permit consumers sharing a common complaint about a defective product or an unfair or deceptive selling practice to pool their claims against a
manufacturer or seller and hire attorneys to press the class action suit in a federal
court on behalf of all the plaintiffs. Put bluntly, the consumer class action is
necessary because existing private legal remedies cannot meet the needs of a
consumer having a litigable claim. Let us examine the various pitfalls which
presently deter consumers from seeking redress in the courts and which make
the consumer class action not just desirable but necessary.
A. Individual Suits by Consumers
The problem confronting the consumer who wishes to sue on his own
behalf is practical in nature; it arises from harsh economic reality. Deceptive
advertising, usurious interest rates, overpriced drugs and food, and adulterated
meat are all wrongs that involve small amounts of money, often less than $200.
Very few would be large enough to permit a wronged consumer to secure his
rights through the law as a practical matter. The duped consumer is apt to
have precious little money to support a test case in order to establish the rights
of his fellow consumers, and, in any event, the recovery he may expect would
not likely pay even the court deposit, let alone his lawyer's fee. As a result, the
wronged consumer's most appropriate advocate, the private bar, is put at a
severe and unnecessary disadvantage. Few attorneys, other than the very young
and very idealistic, are eager to endure time-consuming litigation for a, $50 fee;
and a single $200 judgment is not likely to serve as a powerful deterrent to the
wrongdoer. The usury laws prove this. In a study conducted under the auspices
of the University of Pennsylvania, it was concluded that, ",[t]he number of con*
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sumers having no redress because the amount lost is not commensurate with the
attorney's fee constitutes the vast majority."2 Small claims generally do not
warrant individual litigation, and the misbehaving corporations bent on bilking
the consumer fully appreciate this: "In many instances, fraudulent operations
carefully avoid cheating individuals out of large sums of money because they
realize that 'no one bilked out of fifty dollars is going to pay a lawyer to get his
money back.' ""
B. The Shortcomings of Existing Class Action Law
1. Hall v. Coburn Corporation
At the state level, most class action statutes are inadequate to protect the
consuming public's legal rights. The case of Hall v. Coburn Corporation
dramatically illustrates the point. It involved a consumer class action brought
against a finance company charged with violating the New York Retail Instalment Sales Act' by using contracts printed in less than eight-point type."
The class claimants sought to compel Coburn to refund the service charges assessed under the contracts, the penalty provided for by statute.' The trial courts
and the appellate division9 dismissed the action, following a line of New York
class action cases barring class actions brought by persons whose causes of action
arise out of distinct transactions, even though the transactions are similar and are
with a single defendant.
The problem that confronted the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, the group that backed the plaintiffs and asserted the class's rights in Hal,
was identical to that faced by all plaintiffs and their attorneys in like consumer
cases. In such actions attorneys for the plaintiffs must be concerned not so much
with the merits of the suit but with the feasibility of bringing it. If it cannot be
brought as a class action, it cannot feasibly be brought at all.
Therefore, to shake the court from its strict class action rule, plaintiffs urged
the court to recognize
that the poor are, victimized by this type of credit practice; that public
authority is impotent to help them; and only by permitting self-help class
2 Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 395, 409 (1966).
3 Id.
4 No. 16 (N.Y. Ct. App. May 13, 1970).
5 N.Y. PaRS. PROP. LAw §§ 401-18 (McKinney 1962).
6 Section 401(1) of the Retail Instalment Sales Act provides that: "A retail instalment
contract or obligation shall be dated and in writing; the printed portion thereof shall be in at
least eight point type."
7 Section 414(2) of the Act expressly grants a right of civil recovery:
In case of failure by any person to comply with the provisions of this article,
the buyer shall have the right to recover from such person an amount equal to the
credit service charge or charge imposed and the amount of any delinquency, collection, extension, deferral, or refinance charge imposed.
8 Hall v. Coburn Corp., 160 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1968, at 2, col. 3, affd, 31 App. Div. 2d
892, 298 N.Y.S.2d 894 '(1969), aff'd, No. 16 (N.Y. Ct. App. May 13, 1970).
9 31 App. Div. 2d 892, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 894 (1969), aff'd, No. 16 (N.Y. Ct. App. May 13,
1970).
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actions initiated by private individuals and their lawyers can the imbalance be
redressed. 0.
The court expressed empathy with the plight of "the poor victimized by
this type of credit practice"'1 but refused to reverse the line of New York cases or
to follow available contrary authority, thus denying an effective remedy to plaintiffs injured by invalidly assessed service charges. The court expressed as a reason
for not revising the rule the view that the legislative machinery in question did
not go to "the base of the problem" which it said was "economic." The court
said that "it is doubtful if any public good can be accomplished by making a
finance company pay back legally permissible credit charges in an indefinite
number of contracts because the type is too small on printed parts of the
contract."' 2
But it is for the. legislature, not the court, to determine whether it serves
the "public good" to provide that contracts printed in less than eight-point type
should not constitute a contractual basis for service charges. The legislature had
determined that making the finance company pay back credit charges based on
such small-type contracts is in the public interest." When the court holds that this
is in the nature of a "technicality" which does not go to "the base of the problem," it makes a wholly irrelevant distinction. If the requirement is a technicality,
it is one which must be complied with if credit charges are to be valid under
New York law.
There can be no doubt that to afford aggrieved customers an opportunity to
bring a class action for recovery of credit charges too small to justify individual
suits is a benefit to them-a benefit which measures the difference between getting
their money back or not getting their money back. Thus, the court was off the
mark when it considered whether the statute involved properly addressed the
problems of consumers, including the poor. It likewise got off the mark when it
attempted to weigh the public policy of protecting the poor against the public
policy of preventing harassment of suppliers or finance companies who deal with
the poor.
The real questions raised in Hall was whether or not the legislative objective
of the Act was to be given full sweep by affording processes which would make
it practical to seek court relief. If, in order to do so, the class action would be so
subject to abuse that an inordinately onerous burden would be placed on the
defendant, then the court should have revised the class action rules enunciated
in its previous decisions in a way that would avoid imposing such a burden. But
it should not have refused to revise them at all.
The court was apparently making some such evaluation when it said:
The public value of judicial sanction to this kind of class action which
would harass a finance company underwriting credit sales without addressing
itself to the real evil of retail credit buying is open to substantial doubt.' 4
10 No. 16 (N.Y. Ct. App. May 13, 1970).
11 Id.

12 Id.

13 See notes 6-7 supra.
14 No. 16 (N.Y. Ct. App. May 13, 1970).
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But, in striking the balance, the court made its own determination that an infinitesimal impact on credit evils is outweighed by infinite harassment of finance
companies.
That the legislature had declared that credit evils should be and are to be
curbed by use of the judicial process should have been an adequate incentive for
the court to set itself to the task of making its processes afford other than a
theoretical right and a chimerical remedy.' Unfortunately, it was not.
2. Snyder v. Harris
What about the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts as a means of
affording consumers the advantages of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure? Most consumer class suits would involve quite large sums of money in
total damages alleged and reasonably in controversy. It would appear that they
are important enough, moneywise, to engage the federal courts. But the Supreme
Court's ruling in Snyder v. Harris"e does not pernit plaintiffs having "separate
and distinct claims" against a common defendant to aggregate these claims so as
to make up the necessary $10,000 amount in controversy.
Because, as we have seen, the mischief visited on a great many consumers
entitles them to only modest pecuniary relief, it is only through the amalgamation
of several and distinct claims that many consumers will be able to reach the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount prescribed by 28 U.S.C. 1332. Snyder v. Harris
effectively forecloses that possibility.
C. Governmental Agencies as Consumer Advocates
The discussion has thus far centered on the difficulties encountered by the
consumer when he seeks to press his claim in the courts. Before turning to an
analysis of the measures being considered by Congress to remedy the legal infirmities that currently hamper the consumer in his quest for redress through
the courts, let us briefly explore the avenues to relief afforded the consumer by
governmental agency action.
15 Unfortunately, Hall v. Coburn Corp. is typical of state class action law. Similar unnecessarily restrictive state decisions can be found in such states as Mississippi, Massachusetts, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Washington. Coulson v. Harris, 43 Miss. 728 (1871) (dismissal of class
action to enjoin collection of an allegedly illegal tax); Spear v. H.V. Greene Co., 246 Mass.
259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923) '(dismissal of class action on behalf of purchasers of stock notwithstanding fraudulent scheme to victimize "the ignorant and frugal poor"); Smith v. Sparks
Milling Co., 219 Ind. 576, 39 N.E.2d 125 (1942); Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 151
Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603 (1949) (dismissal of class action to enjoin allegedly fraudulent
public utility billing practices and to recover damages for past fraud); Freeman v. State-Wide
Carpet Distribs., Inc., 365 Mich. 313, 112 N.W.2d 439 (1961) (dismissal of class action for
injunctive relief and damages caused by allegedly fraudulent retail carpet sales); Puget Sound
Alumni of Kappa Sigma, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 2d 222, 422 P.2d 799 (1967)
(claims of nonparties excluded from class action to recover illegal fees exacted by city).
Indeed, Philip Schrag, who serves as chairman of the Consumer Advisory Council of the
New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, observed that the New York court's decision
in Hall "means that consumers victimized by a pattern of abuse have no real remedy in the
courts, except in California, which has a good class-action law." The Wall Street Journal,
May 14, 1970, at 10, cols. 1-2. For an example of the benevolent treatment given the consumer
class action by the California judiciary, see Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433
P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
16 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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It is, of course, the Federal Trade Commission among federal agencies that
has primary concern with consumer matters. Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act condemns unfair or deceptive trade practices, and the Commission traditionally issues cease and desist orders to prevent these.' Let us see
how the processes of this Commission have worked in fact. The case of Holland
Furnace Company will serve as an illustration.
1. Holland Furnace Company
In December, 1936, the company agreed to a Federal Trade Commission
consent order against certain misleading advertising claims." Although complaints against the company continued, 9 a second proceeding was not initiated
by the Federal Trade Commission until 1954.20 Four years later a cease and
desist order was issued prohibiting Holland "from engaging in a sales scheme...
whereby its salesmen gain access to homes by misrepresenting themselves as
official 'inspectors' and 'heating engineers' and thereafter dismantling furnaces
on the pretext that this is necessary to determine the extent of necessary repairs."'"
Holland Furnace Company ignored the court decree enforcing the cease and
desist order 2 and was heavily fined for contempt of court in 1965.2
The twenty-nine years which it took the Federal Trade Commission to bring
the Holland Furnace Company to task demonstrates the danger of overdependence on administrative agencies for consumer protection. Administrative
budgets and personnel are limited, and, in some cases, the statutory structure or
powers of an agency may inhibit its effectiveness. It is also noteworthy that Holland Furnace Company continued its depredations notwithstanding a number of
instances in which it was successfully sued for common-law fraud by individual
homeowners.2 " Though individual homeowners successfully defended contract
actions by Holland Furnace Company on the ground that their contracts had
been induced by fraud,25 this likewise did not inhibit Holland from going right
on defrauding others.
The Holland Furnace saga illustrates the effect on interstate commerce of
widespread consumer frauds. In sustaining the Federal Trade Commission's
jurisdiction over Holland, the Seventh Circuit accepted findings that the company
did business in some forty-five states and had over 15 million customers.2 In
view of the fact that consumer frauds have been estimated to involve several
billion dollars worth of purchases annually,27 it is hardly surprising that fraudulent
practices materially affect interstate commerce.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
18 In re Holland Furnace Co., 24 FTC 1413-14 (1936).
19 48 CONSUMER BuLL., April, 1965, at 25-26.
20 In re Holland Furnace Co., 55 FTC 55 (1958), aff'd, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
21 Id. at 91.
22 In re Holland Furnace Co., 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'g 55 FTC 55 '(1958).
23 In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
24 E.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 157 Colo. 378, 402 P.2d 628 (1965).
25 E.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75, 360 P.2d 412 (1961); Holland
Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wash. 2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953).
26 Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 932 '(1960).
27 See Comment, supra note 2.
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2. BureaucraticProcess v. Court Process
I share Walter Gellhorn's disillusionment with bureaucratic process."' I
believe the practicing bar is the American consumer's most powerful and appropriate champion and that the courts are the consumer's most effective forum.
In fashioning my part of the legislation that will be discussed in Part II of
this article, I have followed this tenet: Good legislation must account for the
existence of competing interests or forces which are otherwise self-motivated, and
it must supply machinery, readily at hand, to accomplish the public purpose.
The public purpose may be the sharing of increased productivity and the furtherance of industrial justice-as in the National Labor Relations Act--or it may be
the extension of the availability of electric power-as in the TVA and RBA
programs.
II. Consumer Class Action Bills in Congress
A. The Judiciary Committee Bills
With this tenet in mind, Senator Tydings and I introduced companion "bills
in the spring of 1969. " These bills went to the respective Judiciary Committees
of the Senate and House. They provided that federal district, couits should have
original jurisdiction, regardless of the amount in controversy, of civil actions
brought by consumers similarly situated where the action, cbmplained of involved
the violation of consumers' rights under state or federal. statutory or decisional
law for the benefit of consumers and where the alleged violation affected commerce. They provided further that rule 23 should govern the conduct of these
actions.

In July, 1969, the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements.in Judicial
Machinery, of which Senator Tydings is chairman, held hearings to consider
the merits of this legislation. I testified at those hearings. Other witnesses included Ralph Nader and Bess Myerson Grant, Commissioner of the Department
of Consumer Affairs for the City of New York.
One witness, Mrs. Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for
Consumer Affairs, presented an interesting, divergent approach to consumer
protection. In her testimony she suggested legislation to permit consumer class
action suits for the broad range of practices defined as "unfair or deceptive"
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
B. The Commerce Committee Bills
After the hearings, Senator Tydings and I concluded that Mrs. Knauer's
proposal was a valuable one and that it could be used to complement the
legislation that we introduced in the spring. We then encompassed it in new
See W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS (1956).
29 S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 11656, 91st "Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
Senator Tydings discusses consumer class action legislation in Tydings. The Private Bar28

Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 478 (1970).
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companion bills, S. 3092 and H.R. 14585, which went to the respective Commerce Committees of each body. Here is what those companion bills provide:
I First, they amend th6.Federal Trade Commission Act to provide that consumers who have been damaged by unfair or',deceptive practices in commerce
are entitled to bring civil suits in the form of class actions." Under present law
the Federal Trade Commission Act provides only for the processing of cases
against persons engaged in unfair or deceptive practices by the Commission
itself.
Second, they make an "act in defraud of consumers which affects commerce" an unlawful act which will give rise to a civil action triable in the district
courts of the United States. 1 Such suits may be tried without regard to the
amount in controversy. An "act in defraud of consumers" is defined as including
two distinct things: An unfair br deceptive act or practice that the 'Federal
Trade Commission Act condemns in section 5(a) (1), and an act which gives
rise to a civil actionby a consumer or :consumers under state statutory or decisional law for the benefit of consumers.
'Such a suit in federal court *wouild,apply the law of the states -in exactly
the same manner that the federal courts apply such law in 6 diversity of citizenship case. Thus, the court in any suit would be dealing with a definite body of
law in a manner in which it is accustomed to deal with such- law; there would be
nothing unfamiliar in the bills which would make it difficult for the court to
proceed according to customary piadtices. For instance, the conflict-of-laws
principles whichthe' forum ordinarily applies in diversity cases would establish
the law applicable to any sft'of facts before the court. ,
It is very' important in-'these bills, however; that the substantive offenses,
initially spelled out in state law, .be ,considered as federal offensei triable in a
federal court and that the basis for jurisdiktion be without respect to amount
in controversy.
Of course, suits in federal court on diversi of citizenship can presently
be tried on the basis of'state substantive law,. just as suits under these bills would
be tried:-- with one exception.: There is no minimum jurisdictional amount in
the propoged act. This is important because, as-we have'said, in Snyder v. Harris
it was held that clain of the individuals in the class action 6annot be aggregated
toward. the.$10,000 ihinimim.
Also introduced in thelCommerce'Committeewas the Administration's own
bill. 2 This bill provides for class actions only after a "triggering" device -under
which the Attorney General,and the Federal Trade Commission must proceed to a
final cease- and desist :order in the districf court before 'a consumer may bring
a class action;s

30 , H.R. 14585, 91st Cong., 1st-Sess. § 2 (.1969); S. 3092, 91st.Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969).
31 H.R. 14585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969); S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969).
32. H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., '1st Sess. (1969). The House bill was inftroduced on November
20, 1969, by Congressman Staggers; a companion bill in the Senate, S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969), was introduced on December 3, 1969, by Senator Magnuson.
33 See H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 ('1969)'; S. 3201, 91st Cong.,. 1st Sess. §
204 (1969). ,
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C. The Two Bases of Substantive Law
It will be seen that, though all of the bills which have been introduced
culminate in some form of class action process governed by federal rule 23, the
substantive law applied by the process stems from two general sources: a state
law source and a federal law source.
1. State Law Source
The state law source is exemplified by the Tydings-Eckhardt bills that went
to the Judiciary Committee. 4 Those bills also make such federal law as there
now is in the consumer field the basis for a class action under rule 23, but that
would generally be the case anyway. Their important ingredient is the provision that essentially state law for the benefit of consumers is adopted as federal
law and may be pursued under the class action process provided under federal
rule 23.
Essentially the same process is provided in the original draft of the Commerce Committee bills. 5
2. FederalLaw Source
Administration Approach. The Administration approach respecting the
federal law source is the most restricted: no action may be brought by an individual or class until the government has successfully terminated its own lawsuit." Under this unprecedented approach, the Attorney General and the Federal
Trade Commission stand like traffic policemen giving the green light to one group
of would-be litigants and the red light to others. There are four compelling
reasons why this approach is unacceptable.
First, most defrauded individuals would have no remedy because the government cannot possibly act in more than a small fraction of all the cases of
deceit and overreaching against consumers. The Federal Trade Commission
currently receives about 9,000 complaints a year. It is able to investigate only
one out of eight or nine of these, and of the small fraction investigated, only one
in ten results in a cease and desist order." To achieve this record, the Federal
Trade Commission has a staff of 1,200, including 500 lawyers. It operates on
a $14 million annual budget. 3
To accomplish the purpose outlined for it under the Administration bill, the
Justice Department proposes to establish a division of thirty persons for the first
year on a budget of $1.3 million. Sixty persons are envisioned for the second
year? 9 If existing staff members are to be assigned to do this work, it is dif34 S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 11656, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
35 S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; H.R. 14585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)
36 See H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 204-5 (1969); S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 204-5 (1969).
37

See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSiON 58-59 (1969).
38 Id. at 87.
39 See Hearings on Class Actions and Other Consumer Protection Procedures Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Cor-

[Vol. 45 :663]

CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS

ficult to see how they could do it without neglecting other duties, because
Attorney General Mitchell has testified that, at least with respect to organized
crime, "a substantial increase in manpower is absolutely necessary to deal with
the magnitude of the problem."' Clearly, in view of FTC operating experience,
an office of thirty persons in the Justice Department is an unrealistic proposal.
Second, small consumers would first have to influence the Department of
Justice to seek relief for them. Often poor, sometimes uneducated, and frequently somewhat skeptical of the government to begin with, the small consumer might have little success in convincing an agency of the federal government to proceed with his case, and unless he were successful, he could not proceed on his own. Thus, the consumer, in order to prevail, would have to press
his case twice: once before the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Cornmission and then again, if he were lucky, before the court.
Third, the Federal Trade Commission tends to be attuned to those it
regulates, and the consumer is at a disadvantage as against administrative
lawyer-lobbyists. Extensive lobbying by corporate law firms, along with their
frequent representation of corporate clients before the Federal Trade Commission, affords an opportunity for these lawyers and lobbyists to learn the
intricacies of Commission practice and the modes of influencing a decision.
Furthermore, as is well known, the normal route of advancement for agency
experts is to move to the employ of the corporations that they have formerly
helped to regulate. In this milieu, the small voice of the consumer may not
be heard.
Fourth, the triggering device would give the Attorney General or the
Federal Trade Commission the power to favor one competitor over another.
Can government legitimately establish that certain acts are prohibited and that
their commission may result in civil- liability but then afford a remedy only to
those whom the government chooses to single out? Suppose Montgomery Ward
and Sears Roebuck both retail chain saws whose lubrication systems are allegedly
so defective that the saw links fall apart. But then suppose the Attorney General
chooses to sue only Montgomery Ward. If the Attorney General is successful,
he opens up a flood of civil litigation against Montgomery Ward; but Sears
Roebuck, which may be equally derelict, is insulated from civil suit.
House Subcommittee Preprint Approach. Under the approach contained
in the House Subcommittee Preprint, that is, the draft that the Subcommittee
worked on in formulating the bill finally recommended, the federal law basis
was handled in this way:
Instead of providing that the government must obtain a final order before
an affected party can proceed with a class action, the Subcommittee Preprint
provided that the Federal Trade Commission should make general rules, violations of which would give rise to consumer class actions by any person affected."1
merce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 209-10 (1970) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General McLaren)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
40 Hearings on Appropriations for the Dep'ts of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies for 1970 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 216 (1969).
41 H.R. , 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (Subcomm. Preprint of "Consumer Class Action

Act" May 4, 1970).
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Though the initial time for establishment of the rules would occupy considerable
time, once a rule was made it would be applicable to all, and at least most of
the objections to the Administration approach would be obviated. Also, the
Subcommittee Preprint would have allowed consumer class actions to be brought
immediately, without any requirement of prior administrative action, where
the act complained of involved a violation of consumer rights protected under
state statutory or decisional law for the benefit of consumers.42
Senate Committee Approach. The Senate Committee approach" resembles
and grows out of the provisions of the original S. 3092 and H.R. 14585, which
we have called the Commerce Committee bills. It provides that a violation of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act gives rise directly, and without
any triggering device, to a consumer class action in the courts.
There are some difficulties with this approach, though it cannot be faulted
as severely as the Administration approach. The difficulty is that the language
of section 5 condemning unfair or deceptive acts is the kind of broad, general
language that is frequently used to define the area in which a commission may
regulate. It is envisioned that the Commission, in exercising its administrative
authority, will further refine the limitations and define what constitutes unfair
and deceptive practices.
D. Bill From House Subcommittee
The Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in the House, acting on the Subcommittee Preprint, accepted the Administration approach to class actions based on federal
law. Thus, it listed eleven specific practices which give rise to civil class actions
and it approved the triggering device." Standing alone this, of course, would be
subject to the four criticisms previously leveled at the Administration approach.
But the Subcommittee adopted, in another title, a provision for class actions to
be brought in the case of "an act or omission . . .which gives rise to a civil
action by... consumers under State statutory or decisional law for the benefit of
consumers." Of course, for such act or omission to give rise to a federal civil
class action, the act must have been "a part of the business of a supplier whose
business affects commerce."45
"In order for an action to be entertained" the action must be "of such
nature as to be entertainableunder rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."m The court would determine this in a pretrial hearing as is now done
under rule 23.
So far, these provisions in the Subcommittee report have the identical effect
of similar provisions in the Judiciary Committee bills and the original Commerce
Committee bills introduced by Senator Tydings and Representative Eckhardt.
However, the new provisions for class actions contain four substantial alterations:
42 Id. § 201.
43
44

Senate Commerce Comm.Draft Amendment of S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d -Sess. (1970).
§ 201 '(Comm. Print Showing H.R. 14931 as Ordered

45

Id. § 301(a).

46

Id. § 301(b).

H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
Reported by Subcomm. June 2, 1970).
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First, it is expressly stated that the "jurisdiction of ,the district courts of the
United States . . . shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
States."47 Further, when the state court tries the' case filed under this federal
statute, it must apply the provisions of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure4
Second, since such federal cases are made triable in state courts under
federal rule! 23, it is now possible to permit the federal district court almost full
discretion to dismiss without prejudice to refiling the case as a federal case in
the state court. But in doing so the federal court must consider:
(A) the nature and importance of the case;
(B) the condition of its docket and the likelihood that the matter
would unduly delay other cases;
(C) the multidistrict or multistate nature of the matter; and
(D) the relative49proceduraladvantagesof trying the case in the Federal
or in the State court.
Third, the federal court is limited in its jurisdiction to cases in which the
amount in controversy exceeds $25,000, but the requisite jurisdictional amount
may be established by aggregating the claims of all members of the class.5 Such
requisite amount in controversy is not applicable to the jurisdiction of a state
court trying the case under federal law.
Fourth, in order for a person to be a member of the class, either in the
state or federal court, his loss must exceed ten dollars."Like all previous versions of the class action provisions based on state
substantive law, the bill reported by the Subcommittee does not prevent a
plaintiff from seeking redress solely under state law and proceeding to trial
under state law. The adoption of state law as federal law does not result in
grounds for removal on the basis that a federal question is raised merely by invoking state law which could also be the basis of a federal action. It is provided:
Section 1441 of title 28, United States Code, shall not apply with respect
to any action of which the district couJrts have jurisdictionsolely by reason of
section 301(c) 52
The election given to the plaintiff to proceed in either the state or federal
court is just what is done with respect to in personam maritime claims in the
"savings clause" of 28 U.S.C. Section 1333. Removal under section 1441 is
not a constitutionally compelled but a prudential disposition, subject to whatever qualification Congress may dictate.
III. Conclusion: The Federal Concern
It has been pointed out in Part I that the need for consumer protection
47 Id.§ 301(c).
48 Id.

49 Id. § 302(b) (2).

50 Id.§ 302(b)(1).
51 Id.§ 301(d).
52 Id. § 303.
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is not met by individual suits, by existing class action law, or by governmental
agencies acting as consumer advocates. The various legislative approaches to the
problem have been outlined in Part II, and it has been shown that these utilize
two bases for substantive law: the federal source and the state source.
It remains to be shown that legislative action is not only needed but that
it is a matter of federal concern properly within the authority of Congress under
the commerce clause. If this be shown, then, of course, the federal courts can
constitutionally try cases arising under the congressional legislation because such
cases would fall in the category of "cases in Law and Equity arising under...
the laws of the United States ....
53
Since the House Subcommittee bill has, at the time of this writing, advanced
farther in the legislative process than any other version, it will be the primary
legislation discussed here.
A. The Nature of Federal Concern
Title I of the Subcommittee bill makes the finding that "there is a Federal
interest in curbing unfair and deceptive practices which affect commerce."'
What is the federal need, the federal concern, in the field of deceptive practices
which affect commerce? Two needs immediately suggest themselves: (1) the
need for an effective process for consumers, where their transactions affect commerce, to obtain justice in the American marketplace, and (2) the need for
a process which is uniform enough and sufficiently national in scope to bring
together as plaintiffs in a single suit classes of consumers which are nearly always
potentially nationwide.
There is not only a federal interest in class actions, but a practical necessity
that the problem be dealt with federally if a process adequate to take care of
this type of litigation, as a whole, is to be devised. Such is particularly true where
the action involves a broad class of consumers dealing with businesses affecting
interstate commerce. That is all that is dealt with in this bill. An examination of
how a federal court deals with these matters in a multidistrict situation illustrates
the point.
The Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation, composed of federal
judges familiar with the large class action, has promulgated a Manual for
Complex and Multi-DistrictLitigation. In it, it is recommended that at a first
principal pretrial conference a schedule be established for early determination
of the class action questions (such as discovery) in all potential class actions
under rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5
Frequently, the same kind of case arises in several districts with one set of
plaintiffs asking to represent all similarly situated persons nationwide. Thus, the
schedule for determination may refer all the cases to a single judge who will, in
the second principal pretrial conference, determine the class action issue. Other53 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
54 H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 102 (Comm. Print Showing H.R. 14931 as Ordered
Reported by Subcomm. June 2, 1970).
55 CCH, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION 36 (n.d.).
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wise, there would not only be a number of courts deciding issues resting on the
same set of facts in separate, frequently lengthy proceedings, but there would
be confusion as to which group of plaintiffs represents the class. There would
also be the potential of conflicting determinations by different judges as to the
rights of the members of the class whose interests are separately adjudicated.
These are problems that exist now, under existing law. They are not insurmountable when they arise in federal courts. They are, or may be, to say the
very least, very difficult when they arise in state courts under state law. Obviously,
there is a strong federal interest in affording an orderly procedure for protecting
members of the class who reside all over the nation.
B. Congress Can Provide a Forum for the Enforcement of State Law
Professors Harry Wellington and Alexander Bickel in their comments on
the very similar problem in connection with section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, say:
The point is simply that providing a forum for the enforcement of state
law in a field which Congress could occupy is itself a species of regulation, a
way of seeking a degree of uniformity while leaving the maximum room
for the exercise of initiative by the states. It is a way of striving for a
measure of co-ordination by consent and persuasion - a way of setting up
something like a clearing house of ideas.... Since the federal circuits do
influence each other and operate under a single Supreme Court, this contribution in turn is bound to tend in the direction of harmonizing state
It would be most regrettable if a federal constitution forbade
policies ....
the general government to exercise its regulatory powers in this forbearing,
sanguine, and initially perhaps experimental manner which turns to account
the genius of a federal system.50
There is another rationale and another line of cases supporting the House
Subcommittee bill's utilizing state law as federal law. State law (which protects
consumers) is adopted and incorporated into federal law and is applied as
federal law in actions brought in the district courts under the provisions of the
proposed act.5 7 There is no question but that state law may be adopted as
federal law in this way.
In Sharpnack v. United States,5 8 the Supreme Court confronted the fact
that Congress had adopted, as federal law for federal enclaves, all existing and
future state criminal statutes. The Court sustained this action and in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Burton, and joined by Justices Brennan, Clark, Harlan,
Whittaker and Frankfurter, and Chief Justice Warren, stated:
There is no doubt that Congress may validly adopt a criminal code
for each federal enclave. It certainly may do so by drafting new laws or
by copying laws defining the criminal offenses in force throughout the
State in which the enclave is situated ....

Whether Congress sets forth the

56 Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HIv. L. REv. 1, 20 (1957).
57 H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-2 (Comm. Print Showing H.R. 14931 as
Ordered Reported by Subcomm. June 2, 1970).
58 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
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assimilated laws in full or assimilates them by reference, the result is as
definite and as ascertainable as are the state laws themselves.
... Rather than being a delegation by Congress of its legislative
authority to the States, it is a deliberate continuing adoption by Congress
for federal enclaves of such unpre-empted offenses and punishments as
shall have been already put in effect by the respective states for their own
government . ..
This procedure is a practical accommodation of the
mechanics of the legislative functions of the State and Nation ....
Federal enforcement of state civil law is in fact commonplace. The Federal
Tort Claims Act leaves the question of liability to be determined by the law of
the state where the negligent conduct occurred. 0 In Maryland v. United States6
the court explained the rationale behind the Federal Tort Claims Act:
Congress was creating a liability not theretofore existing on the part of
the government. To have defined all of the tort rules under which liability
could be established would have been an almost impossible undertaking;
but standards of liability were necessary and Congress was compelled, as
a practical matter,
to adopt the principles and standards of local law in
62
defining them.
It seems now well accepted that federal law can assimilate state law as has
been done in admiralty and limitation proceedings," in bankruptcy laws,64 in
the admissibility of evidence,6 5 in defining "children" under the Copyright Act, 66
in the Emergency Price Control Act, 7 in tax law,6 and in other instances.6"
C. House Subcommittee Bill Properly Addresses Federal Concern
As reported out of the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance,
H.R. 14931 is a sound approach tcr the problem of affording access to the courts
for consumers. Though its title II embraces almost verbatim the Administration
bil 70 - and standing alone would be most inadequate - title III follows the
pattern of the Tydings-Eckhardt bills and supplies the general corpus juris for
consumer class suits relying on state law. To paraphrase Maryland v. United
States: To have defined all of the rules governing deceit and overreaching as
federal law under which liability could be established would have been an almost
impossible undertaking; but standards of liability are necessary and Congress is
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 293-94.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1964).
165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
Id. at 871.
Cf. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
See 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
67 See IA J. MooPE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE If 0.323[22] (1965).
68 Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5
(1937).
69 See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294-96 (1940) for additional instances
where this practice was followed.
70 Compare M-R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-10 (Comm. Print Showing H.R.
14931 as Ordered Reported by Subcomm. June 2, 1970) with H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 201-10 (1969) and S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-10 (1969).
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compelled, as a practical matter, to adopt principles and standards of local law
in defining them. 1 This is title III.
But it is not amiss to move gingerly in the area of defining certain federal
standards. The eleven standards of title II, too restrictive standing alone, may
be desirable as a cautious approach to adoption of such standards. I, myself,
would not like to see us construct a two-track railroad, one track for relief being
state substantive law covering the entire field and the other being federal substantive law of equally comprehensive scope. That is the reason general reliance
on state law with cautious supplementation by federal substantive provision is
my recommendation. The Subcommittee bill is not sufficiently precise in its title
II to fit this pattern perfectly. -The Subcommittee Preprint would have been
better. But since .title III has been quite well perfected and would grant real
and meaningful relief to consumers at their own behest and without a "triggering" device, the bill is, in my opinion, an adequate vehicle for consumer relief,
and its passage would be a step toward justice and reform comparable in this
day to. the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act in the days of President Wilson.

71 See Letter from Charles- L. Black, Jr. to 'Cdigressman Bob Ecklhardt, May 27, 1969,
reprinted in Hearings 23, 24.

